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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20040169-CA
OSCAR VALLE-FLORES,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction entered upon a conditional guilty plea to one
count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a third
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West 2004), in the
Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Sheila K. McCleve presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress evidence
discovered when officers executed a search warrant supported by two affidavits—(1) an
original affidavit that contained minor errors, presented to the magistrate before he signed
the warrant, and (2) a second affidavit, which corrected the errors, presented to the
magistrate after he signed the warrant but before officers executed it?
This Court reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying a trial court's
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, <f 15,

P.3d

. The Court reviews for correctness the application of law to the underlying

findings. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES, PROVISIONS, AND RULES
The following constitutional provision is relevant to this appeal:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count of unlawful possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West 2004), and one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5
(West 2004). The information gave notice that defendant was subject to enhanced
penalties on both counts because the offenses were committed within 1000 feet of a
school, park, church, etc. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a) (West 2004).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence discovered pursuant to the
execution of a search warrant. R89-94. The trial court took evidence and heard
argument on the motion at a hearing extending over several days. See R300:cover sheet
and index. Both parties filed memoranda. See R106-14, 115-23, 203-11, 212-26. The
court denied the motion and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. R229-30,
233-35,236.
2

In exchange for defendant's agreement to enter a guilty plea, the State amended
the possession with intent to distribute charge to a third degree felony and dismissed the
paraphernalia charge. R277, 279-86. Defendant reserved his right to appeal the denial of
the motion to suppress. Id.
The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term not to exceed five years, but
stayed the sentence and imposed a twelve-month term of probation. R287, 290-92.
Defendant timely appealed. R294.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Offense
After securing a warrant, police searched the residence defendant shared with his
cousin. R298:5; 300:33, 45-46. Officers found marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and
"pay/owe sheets" in the southeast bedroom. R3. Defendant admitted that the he
occupied the southeast bedroom. R4.
In his plea statement, defendant stated that he knowingly and intentionally
possessed marijuana with an intent to distribute. R280.
Proceedings on the Motion to Suppress
Testimony given at the hearing on the motion to suppress. Alan Boyd Clark, a
Salt Lake City police officer, testified that he was the case agent in this case. R300:32.
Based on his investigation, he prepared a search warrant affidavit. Id; see also R130-33
(Affidavit for Search Warrant, State's Exhibit 1 presented at motion to suppress). He
also prepared an accompanying search warrant. R300:33; see also R134-135 (Search
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Warrant, State's Exhibit 2 presented at motion to suppress). On April 18, 2002, he took
the documents to the magistrate, Judge Frank Noel, who signed them both. R300:33.
Upon reviewing the affidavit prior to execution of the warrant, Officer Clark
noticed that the affidavit's original description of the property to be searched indicated
the correct address at 626 South Pueblo Street, but that some later references in the body
of the affidavit indicated an incorrect address at 624 South Pueblo Street. R300:34. The
warrant itself referred only to the correct address. R300:35.
The initial paragraphs of both the affidavit and search warrant not only referenced
the correct address at 626 South Pueblo Street, but also described the premises as "a
duplex constructed of tan brick with dark brown trim[.] [T]he front door is green in color
and faces to the north with the numbers 626 displayed on it. The duplex is located on the
West side of Pubelo (sic) Street and is the third structure south of the intersection of 600
South and Pueblo Street." R134 (warrant); see also R130 (affidavit).
Concerned about the presence of some erroneous references to 624 South Pueblo
Street in later paragraphs of the affidavit, Officer Clark contacted the on-call magistrate
to ask him how to correct the error. R300:35. The on-call magistrate indicated that he
had not experienced this kind of problem before and was unable to provide any help.
R300:35, 50. Officer Clark then contacted Judge Noel at his home, explained the
situation, told Judge Noel that he had prepared another affidavit, and asked if Judge Noel
would be willing to sign the new affidavit. R300:35. Judge Noel told Officer Clark to
bring the affidavit to his home and stated that he would sign it. Id; see also Rl36-39
(Affidavit for Search Warrant, State's Exhibit 3 presented at motion to suppress). The
4

new affidavit changed references to 624 South Pueblo Street to 626 South Pueblo Street,
but otherwise duplicated the original affidavit. See Rl36-39.
Officer Clark took the original affidavit, the warrant, and the corrected affidavit to
Judge Noel's home at approximately five o'clock on April 22, 2002. R300:36. Judge
Noel signed the new affidavit. Id. Judge Noel also reviewed the search warrant he had
previously signed. R300:37. Judge Noel, like the on-call magistrate, had not addressed a
similar situation before. R300:50.
Judge Noel asked Officer Clark whether he had prepared a new warrant. R300:37.
Officer Clark said that he had not and asked whether he needed to do so. R300:37.
Judge Noel responded, "Well, if the facts haven't changed, it's the same address, I don't
know that we need to change it." R300:37-38. Neither Officer Clark nor Judge Noel
made any change to the previously-signed warrant. R300:38.
Later that evening, Officer Clark and other officers executed the warrant.
R300:45-46. They found various items of contraband, including marijuana,
paraphernalia, and "pay/owe sheets" in defendant's bedroom. R3.
Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. The trial court found that the
facts occurred as Officer Clark had testified. See R234-35. The court concluded that
(1) "[t]he mistakes in the original affidavit were not material defects," (2) "[t]here was
sufficient probable cause in the affidavits to support the search warrant," and (3) "[t]he
search warrant was valid under the totality of the circumstances." R234-35.

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the warrant was invalid because it "c[ould] not validly be
reissued based upon an affidavit executed" after the magistrate signed the warrant, albeit
before officers executed the warrant. Defendant does not, however, claim that the
warrant was otherwise defective or that the original affidavit, presented to the magistrate
before he signed the warrant, could not support it. The trial court, in fact, found that both
affidavits presented probable cause to support the search warrant.
Thus, by challenging only the sufficiency of the second affidavit, defendant has
challenged only one of two independent bases supporting the trial court's ruling.
Defendant presents only a non-dispositive claim, and this Court may affirm without
addressing it.
In any case, the court properly denied the motion to suppress because the warrant
was not defective. The warrant itself referenced the correct street address, as did the
original affidavit in its initial pages. Affidavit errors listing an incorrect street address do
not invalidate a warrant that itself lists the correct address. Even if both the affidavit and
the warrant had listed the incorrect address, the detailed description of the premises to be
searched was sufficient to permit the officers executing the warrant to ascertain and
identify the place to be searched. Moreover, Officer Clark was both the affiant and the
executing officer. He had conducted surveillance on the residence prior to preparing the
original affidavit. Under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that the minor errors
in the affidavit would have caused confusion about what place could be searched.

6

Finally, even had the warrant been defective, the search would have been valid
under the good faith exception. Officer Clark took every step that could reasonably have
been expected of him to assure that the warrant was valid. After explaining to the
magistrate the problems in the original affidavit and securing the magistrate's signature
on the second affidavit, Officer Clark asked the magistrate whether he needed to prepare
a new warrant. The magistrate told him that he did not. The officer therefore acted in
good faith when he executed the warrant. The Supreme Court has expressly refused to
rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who, in similar circumstances, has
advised the officer that the warrant he possesses authorizes the search.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ADEQUATELY CHALLENGED THE
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER, THE WARRANT WAS NOT
DEFECTIVE, AND, IN ANY CASE, POLICE OFFICERS ACTED IN
GOOD FAITH IN SECURING AND EXECUTING THE WARRANT
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied the motion to suppress.
See Br. Appellant at 24. Defendant claims that the amended affidavit could not support
the search warrant because it had not been presented to the trial judge when he found
probable cause to issue the search warrant. See id. at 15. Even assuming that defendant
could prove this claim, that alone would not demonstrate that the trial court erred when it
denied the motion to suppress. Despite its minor errors, the original affidavit presented
probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant and described the premises to be
searched with sufficient detail that the officers could, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place to be searched. Moreover, Officer Clark acted in good faith when
7

he executed the search warrant after he presented the second affidavit to the judge and
after the judge told him that a new warrant was not necessary.
A.

Defendant does not challenge an independent, alternative basis for the trial
court's ruling, and this Court can therefore affirm without addressing
defendant's claim.
Defendant argues that the warrant was defective because a warrant cannot rest on

an affidavit presented after the warrant has been signed, but before the warrant is
executed. See Br. Appellant at 15.
Even assuming that defendant could make out this claim under the unique facts of
this case, defendant could not prevail. The facts clearly demonstrate that the original
affidavit was presented to the magistrate before he issued the warrant. R300:33. The
trial court found that the mistakes in the original affidavit were not material and that there
was sufficient probable cause in the affidavits, which differed only with respect to those
non-material mistakes, to support the search warrant. R235-36. Thus, the trial court
found that the original affidavit sufficed to support the search warrant.
Defendant does not claim that the original warrant was insufficient to support the
warrant or that the trial court erred when it concluded that "[t]he mistakes in the original
affidavit were not material defects." R3234. Nor has he cited any authority that would
support that position. Therefore, even assuming the amended affidavit could not support
the warrant, nothing suggests that the original affidavit could not.
Thus, defendant makes only a non-dispositive claim of error. Defendant
challenges only the effectiveness of the second affidavit. As a practical result, he fails to
attack an independent, alternative basis for the trial court's ruling. Where a defendant
8

challenges one basis for a trial court's decision on appeal, but does not address an
additional and independent basis, the appellate court may affirm without addressing
either basis. See, i.e., Pugh v. State, 89 S.W.3d 909, 912 (Ark. 2002) (observing that
"where trial court expressly based its decision on two independent grounds and
[defendant] challenged only one on appeal," the court could uaffirm[] without addressing
either"); Roop v. Parker Northwest Paving Co., 94 P.3d 885, 895 (Or. App. 2004)
(holding that where party "faile[ed] to challenge the alternative basis of the trial court's
ruling, [the appellate court] must affirm it"); Magco of Maryland, Inc. v. Barr, 545
S.E.2d 548, 548 (Va. 2001) (concluding that where "there is an independent basis for [a]
judgment... that is not challenged on appeal, [the] Court cannot reach the merits of
those errors assigned by the appellant").1
B.

The original affidavit supports the warrant; references to 624 South Pueblo
Street in the original affidavit did not invalidate the warrant.
Defendant makes no claim that the facts in either affidavit failed to establish

probable cause. He may believe that the warrant was invalid because, due to several
references to an inaccurate house number in the affidavit, it did not particularly describe
the place to be searched. See U.S. CONST amend. IV; State v. Atkin, 2003 UT App 359,
fflf 21-22, 80 P.3d 157 (describing purposes of the "particularity requirement").

1

Defendant also fails to adequately brief the issue. By addressing only one of two
bases for the decision of the trial court, defendant u dump[s]" on this Court "the burden of
argument and research" with respect to additional issues critical to any disposition of the
case. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416
N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. App. 1981)) (internal quotation omitted).
9

If this is defendant's claim, it fails. First, the search warrant itself accurately
describes the place to be searched, including the house number. Where the search
warrant accurately identifies the house number, the warrant is valid even though the
affidavit may inaccurately identify the house number. See United States v. Jones, 208
F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that typographical error in affidavit's street address
did not render search warrant, which listed correct address, defective, and characterizing
defendant's contrary claim as "specious at best"); United States v. Larracuente, 740
F.Supp. 160, 164-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (observing that although affidavit twice contained
an erroneous street number, warrant itself contained the correct street address, and
holding that "a mere technical defect... should not void the issuance of the warrant");
State v. Johnson, 408 So.2d 1280, 1284-85 (La. 1982) (noting that despite two errors in
affidavit's recital of address to be searched, warrant addressed only the correct address,
and concluding that warrant was valid).
Moreover, even had both the search warrant and the affidavit inaccurately
identified the house number, the error in the house number would not have been an error
sufficient to invalidate the warrant. Numerous cases have rejected challenges to warrants
even where both the warrant and the supporting affidavit contained errors in the address
listing. See, e.g., United States v. Valentine, 984 F.2d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 1993); State v.
Miller, 495 So.2d 422, 424-25 (La. App. 1986); State v. Groves, All N.W.2d 789, 795
(Neb. 1991); State v. Bisaccia, 279 A.2d 675, 678 (N.J. 1971).
The purpose of the particularity requirement is to describe the places that can be
searched and to "mandate[] that officers acting pursuant to a warrant confine their search
10

to those areas . . . that have been specifically identified in the warrant." Atkin, 2003 UT
App 359, at 122; see also State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) (holding
that "minor technical deficiencies in the warrant's description" do not invalidate a search
warrant so long as "the area searched . . . was the area for which probable cause had been
made out, and the affidavit adequately identified that area"). "[A] warrant is sufficiently
particular if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can with
reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended." Atkin, 2003 UT App 359, at
% 22 (quoting Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102) (emphasis in Anderson) (in turn quoting Steele
v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S.Ct 414 (1925)) (internal quotation omitted); see
also Jones, 208 F.3d at 608 (stating that despite erroneous address number, warrant
provided "ample" descriptions so that officers could identify place intended); Johnson,
408 So.2d 1280, at (La. 1982) (noting importance of physical description of home to be
searched).
Here, the warrant and the initial paragraph of the affidavit both listed the correct
house number. R130, 134. In addition, both described the premises to be searched as "a
duplex, constructed of tan brick with dark brown trim[.] [T]he front door is green in
color and faces to the north with the numbers 626 displayed on it." Id. Moreover, both
stated that the duplex was located on the west side of Pueblo Street and that it was the
third structure south of the intersection of 600 South and Pueblo Street. Id. This
information was sufficient so that the officers executing the search could "with
reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended." Atkin, 2003 UT App 359, at

1122.
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Finally, Officer Clark, who prepared the original affidavit and secured the warrant
and who also presented the second affidavit to Judge Noel, had conducted surveillance at
the premises. See R131. Officer Clark was the case agent and was present when the
search warrant was executed. See R300:32, 45-46. Despite the errors in the affidavit,
Officer Clark could not have been confused about what place could be searched when the
warrant was executed. See Larracuente, 740 F.Supp. 160, 165 (noting that there was "no
real doubt" as to the place to be searched, especially where "the executing officer is also
the affiant who applied for the warrant"); Johnson, 408 So.2d at 1284-85 (La. 1982)
(noting that despite two errors in affidavit's recital of address to be searched, authors of
the affidavit, which also contained correct recitals of the address to be searched, were the
executors of the warrant).
C.

In any event, Officer Clark acted in good faith when, after discussing with the
magistrate the errors in the original affidavit and securing the magistrate's
signature on the corrected affidavit, he relied on the magistrate's
representation that a new warrant was not necessary.
"[E]vidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a

detached and neutral magistrate" is admissible under the "good-faith exception to the
Fourth Amendment."2 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).

2

The good faith exception to the warrant requirement is not applicable where an
officer cannot reasonably rely on the warrant issued by a magistrate. The Supreme Court
has therefore held that the good faith exception is not available (1) where the affiant
includes false information in the affidavit and the magistrate is therefore misled, (2)
where the issuing magistrate "wholly abandon[s] his judicial role," (3) where the warrant
is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable," or (4) where the warrant is "so facially deficient—i.e., in failing
to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing
12

Excluding evidence obtained by an officer "acting as a reasonable officer would and
should act in similar circumstances" can "in no way affect his future conduct unless it is
to make him less willing to do his duty." Id. at 920. "Penalizing the officer for the
magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of
Fourth Amendment violations." Id. at 921.
Assuming arguendo that the search warrant was defective, the evidence
discovered is nevertheless admissible if Officer Clark and the other officers working with
him "reasonably believed that the search they conducted was authorized by a valid
warrant." Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988, 104 S.Ct. 3424 (1984). Where
officers take "every step that could reasonably be expected of them," in securing and
executing a warrant, they act reasonably and can reasonably believe that their search is
conducted pursuant to a valid warrant. Id. at 989.
The facts and holding in Sheppard are instructive. In that case, a Massachusetts
officer, investigating a murder case, prepared a warrant application to search for evidence
of the murder. Id. at 984-85. Under Massachusetts procedures, when the judge signed
the application, he issued a warrant. Id. at 985. The signed application constituted the
warrant. Id.
Because it was Sunday and the local court was closed, the officer had difficulty
finding a warrant application. Id. He finally located a warrant form used for controlled

officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quotation and
citation omitted). This case presents none of these circumstances.
13

substances and attempted to change the form to describe the place to be searched and the
persons and things to be seized in connection with the murder investigation. Id.
The officer took the affidavit and the warrant form to a judge who examined the
affidavit and stated that he would authorize the search. Id. at 986. The officer explained
to the judge that the form as presented dealt with controlled substances. Id. The judge
told the officer that he would make the necessary changes. Id. The judge took the form
from the officer and made some changes, but did not change the substantive portion of
the form. Id. The warrant therefore continued to authorize a search for controlled
substances. Id. The judge signed and dated the form and returned it to the officer,
"informing [the officer] that the warrant was sufficient authority in form and content to
carry out the search as requested." Id. The officer took the affidavit and warrant and,
accompanied by other officers, conducted the search. Id.
At a pretrial suppression hearing, the trial judge ruled that the warrant did not
conform to the commands of the Fourth Amendment because it did not particularly
describe the items to be seized. Id. at 987. On appeal, the state supreme court agreed.
Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officers had acted in
good faith. Id. at 987-88. Responding to the defendant's argument that the officers,
knowing the form was defective, should have examined it to be certain that necessary
changes had been made, the Court stated: "[T]hat argument is based on the premise that
[the officer] had a duty to disregard the judge's assurances that the requested search
would be authorized and the necessary changes would be made." Id. at 989. The Court
explained, "[W]e refuse to rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who has
14

just advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to
conduct the search he has requested." Id. at 989-90.
That reasoning is directly applicable in this case. Here, Officer Clark went to
Judge Noel's home with the original and amended affidavits and the warrant. R300:36.
He explained the inaccuracies in the original affidavit, and Judge Noel signed it.
R300:36-37. After Judge Noel asked him whether he had also prepared a new search
warrant, he said that he had not and asked whether he needed to do so. R300:37. Judge
Noel responded, "Well, if the facts haven't changed, it's the same address, I don't know
that we need to change it." R300:37-38.
Defendant here asks this Court to do what the Supreme Court has expressly
refused to do, i.e., "rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who has just
advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to
conduct the search he has requested." Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989-90.
Officer Clark acted reasonably. He took every step that could reasonably been
expected of him. As the Supreme Court stated in Sheppard, "[T]here is little reason why
[an officer] should be expected to disregard assurances that everything is all right,
especially when he has alerted the judge to the potential problems." 468 U.S. at 990.
In sum, even if the warrant in this case was for some reason defective, Officer
Clark and the accompanying officers acted in good faith when they executed it. The trial
court therefore properly denied the motion to suppress.

15

CONCLUSION
Defendant does not adequately challenge the trial court's ruling on appeal. In any
case, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. The first affidavit, even with
its minor errors, sufficed to describe the premises to be searched. Alternatively, the
officers reasonably relied on the original warrant after the trial judge, alerted to the minor
errors in the first affidavit, assured Officer Clark that a new warrant was not necessary.
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed.
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